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Taking Sides: An Overview of the U.S.




Despite the repeated assertions of U.S. businessmen that
the Arab boycott of Israel has had little effect on their relations
with either Israel or the Arab countries,' and despite the asser-
tions of the State Department that diplomacy is adequate to
deal with the boycott,2 the disposition of Congress to oppose the
boycott has crescendoed from the piano of disclosure to the
sforzando of prohibitive legislation. This article will attempt to
set forth the current legislative scheme, emphasizing the Tax
Reform Act of 1976,1 and to comment upon the legislation as
policy.
The Arab boycott of Israel itself is a loosely administered
intergovernmental organization under the auspices of the Arab
League which maintains a permanent administrative body, the
Central Boycott Office, in Damascus.' The boycott has three
aspects. In its primary, or direct form, it simply involves the
refusal of the participating countries to maintain any economic
relations with Israel. This primary boycott is not an uncommon
act of belligerency under a declared state of war.5 As such, it is
* The authors wish to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Dalma Grandjean
and John Spinnato, both students at the University of Dayton School of Law.
** Member of the Ohio Bar; Foreign Tax Administrator, NCR Corporation;
B.B.A., J.D., Cincinnati.
***Member of the Ohio Bar; Attorney, NCR Corporation; Adjunct Assistant Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law; B.A., Wake Forest, M.B.A., J.D.,
Denver.
1. A general discussion of the "gaps, shortcomings, and failures" of the boycott is
found in D. CHILL, THE ARAB BoYcoTr OF ISRAEL 29-39 (1976).
2. See, e.g., remarks of Sidney Sober, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State News Release, May 14,
1976.
3. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 504, 90 Stat. 1563, codified at
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 44A.
4. D. CHILL, supra note 1, at 3.
5. See generally Muir, The Boycott in International Law, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON.
187 (1974); Bouve, The National Boycott as an International Delinquency, 28 AM. J.
INT'L L. 19 (1934); Lauterpacht, Boycott in International Relations, 14 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L
L. 125 (1933).
614 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
a clear excercise of sovereignty outside the legislative jurisdic-
tion of the United States. Although the thrust of the legislation
is at times excessive, the legislative scheme is therefore gener-
ally directed against the secondary and tertiary, indirect forms
of the Arab boycott. These respectively involve the refusal of
the boycotting countries to deal with foreign firms which en-
gage in certain economic relations with Israel, and the refusal
to deal with foreign firms which transact certain business with
boycotted, or "blacklisted" firms. For example, a non-
boycotted firm may be denied an import license by Arab coun-
tries for a product which contains components manufactured
by a blacklisted company or is manufactured under a license
from a blacklisted company. The erratic application of the in-
direct forms of the Arab boycott is well known,' but in general
the rationale behind it is the same' as that of the direct boy-
cott-to damage, or at least not to assist, the economy of Israel.
Opposition to the boycott has taken several forms: require-
ment of public disclosures by U.S. business of certain manifes-
tations of boycott; the denial of tax benefits in the event of
"cooperation with or participation in an international boy-
cott"; 7 and legislation which would prohibit most boycott-
related activity.8 Additionally, the antitrust laws have been
used to challenge compliance with certain aspects of the Arab
boycott of Israel.' There has also been a flurry of state activity
related to the Arab boycott. 0 Although all the U.S. legislation
applies to all foreign boycotts, it is clear that it has been pro-
mulgated as a response to the Arab boycott.
6. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, April 19, 1976, at 56.
7. Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 1061, codified at INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 908.
8. Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235
(June 22, 1977) (codified in 50 U.S.C. app.).
9. Antitrust as an Antidote to the Arab Boycott: United States v. Bechtel Corp.,
8 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 799 (1976); Note, The Antitrust Implications of the Arab
Boycott, 74 MICH. L. REv. 795 (1976).
10. See, e.g., ch. 1247, 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., 5426 (1976) (to be codified as CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16721, 16721.5, effective Jan. 1, 1977); ch. 613, 1976 Md. Laws,
1702 (1976) (to be codified as MD. COMMERCIAL LAW CODE ANN. §§ 11-2A01 - 11-2A15);
New York, Bill 56411, N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW, § 296.13 (McKinney 1976); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1129.11 (Page).





The Export Administration Act of 1969" states that the
policy of the United States is "to oppose restrictive trade prac-
tices or boycotts fostered or imposed by foreign countries
against other countries friendly to the United States."' 2 The
Act further directs the Department of Commerce to issue regu-
lations which require the reporting of "requests for the furnish-
ing of information or the signing of agreements"' 3 dealing with
restrictive trade practices or boycotts.
Prior to the stir created by the 1976 Presidential debates,
the regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act' required the
reporting to the Office of Export Administration either individ-
ually or in a quarterly accumulation any "request for an action,
including the furnishing of information or the signing of agree-
ments, that has the effect of furthering or supporting a restric-
tive trade practice or boycott .... '"' The regulations distin-
guish between types of requests. They expressly prohibit com-
pliance with any request which "discriminates . .. against
U.S. citizens or firms on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin."' 6 Thus a firm may not, for example, certify
that it has no Jewish members on its board of directors. Firms
receiving requests which do not involve discrimination against
U.S. citizens are "encouraged and requested to refuse to take
any action"' 7 which may support or further a boycott, but are
not prohibited from doing so.
The vast majority of boycott-related requests are either
requests for a certification that goods shipped under a given bill
of lading or letter of credit contain no components manufac-
tured in Israel or requests for a certification that such goods
will not be delivered on a vessel which calls on an Israeli port.
Such certifications are reportable, and in the past constituted
"compliance" with the boycott. The reporting form used the
word "comply" for such actions, and firms furnishing such cer-
11. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413.
12. Id. § 2402(5)(A).
13. Id. § 2403(b)(1).
14. 15 C.F.R. § 369 (1976).
15. Id. § 369.4.
16. Id. § 369.2.
17. Id. § 369.3.
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tifications received highly unfavorable publicity, even though
such certifications usually involved the mere stating of a fact
totally unrelated to the boycott. The Department of Commerce
corrected this problem to a certain extent by a proposed revi-
sion to the regulations which would remove the word "comply"
from the reporting form, and which would eliminate the report-
ing requirement altogether for "positive U.S. certificate of ori-
gin.' 8 Thus, a manufacturer would only be required to report
a request if it certified that goods were not of Israeli origin.
Prior to President Ford's announcement on October 6,
1976, that the names of U.S. companies which had complied
with the Arab boycott would be made public, reports received
by the Office of Export Administration were held in confidence.
After the announcement, however, the regulations were
amended to permit public inspection of the reports received
after October 7, 1976, and eliminated the quarterly multiple
transaction report."9 Currently, a request must be reported
within 15 calendar days after the end of the month in which
the request was received. Some confusion has developed as to
when a request is "received." It should be noted that in the
common situation in which one of the aforementioned certifica-
tions of origin is placed on shipping documents as a result of
direction in a published export manual, the request is deemed
to have been "received" when the certificate is placed on the
document, not when the goods covered by the document are
shipped. The public disclosure is, of course, an effort to dis-
courage any action by U.S. exporters from taking boycott-
related action.
11. FEDERAL TAX LEGISLATION
A. The Tax Law
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 (TRA) contains several provi-
sions which are intended to discourage U.S. taxpayers from
cooperating with international boycotts not sanctioned by the
.United States.20 The TRA does not make cooperation with an
international boycott illegal per se.
18. 41 Fed. Reg. 51,424 (1976).
19. 41 Fed. Reg. 44,861 (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 46,443 (1976).
20. Tax Reform Act of 1976, §§ 1061-64, codified at INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§
908, 952(a), as amended 995(b)(1), as amended § 999 (1976).
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The Act requires all taxpayers to report to the Treasury all
boycotts known to the taxpayer if the taxpayer has operations
in the country enforcing a boycott.2' The report must also con-
tain a list of all boycotts in which the taxpayer was requested
to participate and the extent to which the taxpayer complied
with the request.2 Finally, the Treasury is to publish and
maintain a list of known boycott countries." The taxpayer
must report all operations in the listed countries. 2 The report
will be on Form 571321 and must be filed annually with the
taxpayer's U.S. income tax return .
2
If a taxpayer has agreed to comply with certain defined
boycott activities, the taxpayer will lose tax benefits otherwise
available to it. The benefits lost include the deferral of DISC
income,2 the deferral of earned income of controlled foreign
corporations, 2 and the loss of foreign tax credits. 29 The reduc-
tion of tax benefits will be reflected on Form 1120-DISC, Form
3646, and Form 1118 respectively. 30
It should be noted that while the taxpayer will suffer the
loss of the foreign tax credit with respect to boycott activities,
the foreign tax may be taken as a deduction on the U.S. tax
return2' It will, however, be a foreign source deduction which
will reduce foreign source income.
32
In computing the lost tax benefits, the taxpayer must seg-
regate boycott-tainted income and foreign taxes from all other
foreign income and foreign taxes. The taxpayer may use the
actual amounts involved if it can demonstrate that the
boycott-tainted operation is clearly separate and apart from all
other operations and the amounts are clearly attributable to
the boycott operation." If a clear separation is not possible, the
21. INT. R.EV. CODE OF 1954, § 999(a)(1)(B) [hereinafter cited as I.R.C.].
22. Id. § 999(a)(2).
23. Id. § 999(a)(3).
24. Id. § 999(a)(1).
25. 41 Fed. Reg. 49,923, Question A-5 (1976).
26. Id. Question A-7.
27. I.R.C. § 995(b)(1)(F); see also id. § 999(c)(2).
28. Id. § 952(a)(3).
29. Id. § 908(a).
30. Supra note 25, Question A-5.
31. I.R.C. § 908(b).
32. Id. § 862(b).
33. Id. § 999(c)(2).
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taxpayer must compute its lost tax benefits by means of a ratio,
the International Boycott Factor.34 This fraction consists of a
numerator which includes all of the boycott-related operations
of the taxpayer. The denominator of the fraction is the world-
wide operations of the taxpayer. Worldwide operations is de-
fined to exclude operations in the United States.
3 5
If a taxpayer participates in or cooperates with a boycott
during a tax year, the law establishes a presumption that all
operations related to that boycott are in fact boycott tainted.
3'
To the extent the taxpayer can demonstrate that it has clearly
separate and identifiable operations which are not boycott
tainted within the presumed boycott activities, no tax benefits
will be lost as to the separate operation. 37 The burden of proof,
however, is clearly on the taxpayer.
The Tax Reform Act distinguishes between primary and
secondary boycotts.3 8 A taxpayer must report all known boy-
cotts unless they are sanctioned by the United States. How-
ever, a taxpayer will only lose tax benefits if it agrees to engage
in a secondary boycott which is not sanctioned by the United
States.
The TRA recognizes that a boycott may be enforced both
by the government of a country and by businesses or nationals
of that country.
39
The term "taxpayer" used throughout the foregoing is
technically either a U.S. person or a U.S. shareholder of a
foreign corporation. A U.S. person must report known boycotts
and compute lost tax benefits for itself and its 50 percent or
greater ownership controlled group.' A U.S. person who owns
10 percent or more of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock entitled to vote of a foreign corporation is a U.S.
34. Id. § 999(c)(1).
35. Id. § 999(c)(3).
36. Id. § 999(b)(1).
37. Id. § 999(b)(2).
38. Primary Boycotts are defined at I.R.C. § 999(b)(4)(B), (C). Secondary Boy-
cotts are defined at I.R.C. § 999(b)(3).
39. I.R.C. § 999(b)(3). Throughout this article, the term "boycott country" in-
cludes the country, government, businesses, and nationals of the boycott country.
40. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30).
41. Id. 38 999(a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(2), (c)(1), which refer to the 50 percent control
group test in I.R.C. § 993(a)(3). See I.R.C. § 999(e) for attribution rules between a
person and a corporation vis-a-vis boycotts.
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shareholder of a foreign corporation."2 Finally, if any person
other than a U.S. person claims the benefit of the foreign tax
credit or owns stock in a DISC, it will be subject to the boycott
provisions of the Tax Reform Act.43
B. Necessity of Further Clarification
The international boycott provisions of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 had no predecessor in prior tax law. This has made
the need for clarification and interpretation by the U.S. Treas-
ury even more critical than for most of the new legislation. To
the Treasury's credit, it published a guideline in question-and-
answer format in an attempt to answer the most obvious ques-
tions which would occur to taxpayers." Its reward for this effort
was severe criticism from a member of Congress for telling
taxpayers how to "avoid" the Act's sanctions against interna-
tional boycotts. 5 The Senator has chosen to overlook the fact
that some of the "avoidance" techniques which appeared in the
Treasury Guidelines were suggested in the boycott provisions
of the Conference Report for the Tax Reform Act." The Sena-
tor's assumption that taxpayers should have no guidance from
the Treasury on the complexities of the new Act is hardly con-
ducive to sound tax administration.
4 7
Despite the criticism, it is hoped that additional clarifica-
tion concerning the boycott provisions of the TRA will be forth-
coming from the Treasury. Below are two areas which are in
need for further clarification.
1. International Boycott Factor
If a U.S. taxpayer is unable to segregate boycott-tainted
operations from all others, the taxpayer must use the Interna-
tional Boycott Factor to compute its lost tax benefits. The
Treasury has already indicated that if a taxpayer can segregate
some but not all boycott-tainted activities, it may compute its
lost tax benefits for such separate activities but must forfeit all
deferral, DISC, and foreign tax benefits for other foreign activi-
42. Id. § 999(a)(1) which refers to the 10 percent test in I.R.C. § 951(b).
43. Supra note 25, Question A-1.
44. Supra note 25.
45. Letter to the Secretary of Treasury from Senator Ribicoff, BNA DAILY TAX
REPORT, No. 237, at J-2 (Dec. 8, 1976).
46. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 399 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4118.
47. Id. at 467, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4173.
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ties.48 In the alternative it would be required to use the Interna-
tional Boycott Factor. Therefore, it must be presumed that
most taxpayers will in fact be required to compute the Factor.
The Treasury has indicated that the International Boycott
Factor is to be determined with reference to three items: pur-
chases, sales and payroll. 9 Precisely how the Factor is to be
computed was set out in proposed regulations issued on March
1, 1977.50
The regulations for computing the International Boycott
Factor suffer from numerous defects. Perhaps the most obvious
fault is that the regulations require purchases, sales, and pay-
roll to be added to each other in both the numerator and de-
nominator in order to form the fraction.' Elementary algebra
will convince anyone that the resulting number is not the aver-
age percentage of the individual items, but a number which in
fact has no relevance to anything.
Only a little less obvious a defect in the regulations is the
potential for double counting, particularly within one con-
trolled group. Thus a sale for one group member is a purchase
by another. The proposed regulations attempt to deal with this
problem in the numerator of the Factor but fail to consider the
problem in constructing the denominator. 5
Because of the numerous problems with the International
Boycott Factor regulations as now proposed, it would not be
surprising if they are changed before being issued in final form.
2. Clarification of Scope of Official List
The boycott provisions of the Tax Reform Act require the
Secretary to maintain and publish not less frequently than
quarterly a current list of countries which require or may re-
quire participation in a secondary international boycott as de-
fined in the TRA. While the Act states that the Secretary
"shall" maintain a "current" list, it does not specifically state
the list must contain all boycotts known to the Secretary." To
48. 42 Fed. Reg. 1092, § F-8 (1977).
49. Supra note 25, § F-1.
50. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.999-1, 42 Fed. Reg. 11,845 (1977).
51. Id. § 1.999-1(c).
52. Id. § 1.999-1(b)(7).
53. That the list in fact would not be complete was contemplated by Congress,
supra note 46, at 469, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4175.
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date, the Treasury has not stated whether in fact the official
list will be complete. It is conceivable that one or more boycotts
will be omitted from the list for political or national policy
reasons.
In any audit of a taxpayer's return for tax years after 1975,
it is quite probable that the Internal Revenue agent will have
a complete list of boycott countries including listed, unlisted
and boycott countries discovered subsequent to the tax year
involved. 4 Should the agent assert a deficiency against the
taxpayer for failure to segregate all boycott operations, it is
quite probable that the taxpayer will claim that it has been
misled by the Treasury's failure to list all boycotts. This type
of argument will be most likely to arise if the taxpayer has
listed a suspected boycott in one year but has not seen the
boycott listed officially by the Treasury thereafter. The tax-
payer may then feel justified in not listing the boycott in subse-
quent years in the belief that the Treasury has determined that
the suspected boycott in fact is not of the kind described in the
tax code.
Two parts of the boycott provisions of the TRA suggest
that such arguments by the taxpayer would be looked upon
with disfavor. First, the Act imposes a positive duty upon the
taxpayer to report known or suspected boycotts if the taxpayer
has operations in the boycott country. This requirement is
wholly apart from the requirement that the taxpayer list all
operations in countries which appear on the official list. Sec-
ond, the TRA provides a means by which the taxpayer may
request that the Secretary determine if a particular activity
constitutes a boycott.5 Based upon these two provisions of the
Act, it would seem that the Treasury's official list of boycott
countries must be viewed as an aid in complying with the boy-
cott provisions of the Tax Reform Act but should not be as-
sumed to be complete.
It would be most useful if the Treasury were to state either
that all known boycotts will in fact be listed or that for various
reasons certain boycotts may not be listed. It is doubtful if
either pronouncement will ever be made. To list all countries
54. Id.
55. I.R.C. § 999(d).
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without exception would severely limit the Treasury's options
should political or national policy considerations suggest that
it would be more prudent not to list a particular country. To
state that the Treasury was, as a matter of policy, not listing
certain boycott countries would undoubtedly open the door to
further charges that it is subverting the will of Congress. The
most that can be expected from the Treasury is a rather oblique
reference to the fact that taxpayers cannot rely on the official
list in all circumstances. Such a pronouncement will surely
mean that the list is not complete and the Treasury reserves
the right to not list countries in appropriate cases.
C. Legislation of Morality
The Internal Revenue laws of the United States have,
since the passage of the 16th amendment to the Constitution,
been championed as a vehicle for public policy. Initially, the
income tax was intended to redistribute the nation's wealth
from the have's to the have not's. Over the years, numerous
provisions have been added to the Internal Revenue Code to
achieve more limited national policy objectives. One need look
no further than the Tax Reform Act of 1976 for such provisions.
Several sections of the Act were enacted to encourage capital
formation and, indirectly, new jobs."6 Child and dependent care
provisions were liberalized to permit more individuals to enter
the labor force. 7
Although many provisions of the tax code were enacted to
promote public policy, only a few were enacted to discourage
activities which were perceived as morally repugnant. In gen-
eral, ill-gotten gains have been taxed the same as all other
income. 58 Expenses of a business were permitted as a deduction
on the basis of ordinary and necessary, not on the basis of the
moral acceptability of the activity.59
Congress has on occasion passed tax legislation which is
intended to discourage morally repugnant acts. In computing
taxable income, wagering losses are only allowed to the extent
56. S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 176 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3607.
57. Id. at 132, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3565.
58. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961). See Rutkin v. United States, 343
U.S. 130 (1952).
59. I.R.C. § 162(a). See Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958); Rev. Rul.
323, 1974-2 CUM. BuLL. 40.
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of wagering gains."0 U.S. citizens who move abroad and ren-
ounce their U.S. citizenship in order to avoid the U.S. income
tax may be taxed by the United States in a less favorable
manner than other nonresident alien individuals." Illegal
bribes or kickbacks to government officials or employees
whether made in the United States or overseas cannot be de-
ducted in computing a business's taxable income.2 The same
is true of illegal payments if the law of the United States or any
state would subject the payor to criminal penalties or loss of
license or privilege to engage in a trade or business . 3 Kick-
backs, rebates or bribes paid by providers of service under
Medicare and Medicaid to secure business may not be de-
ducted from income to arrive at taxable income. 4 Restrictions
have been placed on the amount which can be claimed as a
business expense which has been incurred as damages in a
criminal antitrust action.
5
The anti-boycott provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976
are the most ambitious attempt by Congress to date to provide
tax disincentives for a particular activity. The avowed purpose
of the anti-boycott provisions is to discourage U.S. taxpayers
from participating in or cooperating with any international
boycott not sanctioned by the United States. The tax code is a
particularly clumsy vehicle for carrying out such Congressional
intent. Boycott activities do not always relate neatly to ac-
counting for income and expenses and are thus not susceptible
to computing loss of tax benefits. Further, the legislation as
written is a rather crude tool for punishing those who might
engage in a boycott.
In the case of wagering losses, bribes, or illegal payments,
the tax code provisions which restrict deductions bear a direct
relationship to the underlying undesirable activity. Generally,
the event is certain as to time and amount and thus susceptible
to being accounted for in arriving at taxable income. This will
not always be the case when one is attempting to segregate
60. I.R.C. § 165(d).
61. Id. § 877.
62. Id. § 162(c)(1). As to loss of other tax benefits as a result of foreign bribes see
I.R.C. §§ 952(a)(4), 995(b)(1).
63. Id. § 162(c)(2).
64. Id. § 162(c)(3).
65. Id. § 162(g).
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boycott-tainted income and expense. If the taxpayer has one
isolated project or business operation which is boycott tainted,
little problem will be encountered in determining boycott-
tainted income. In the more common situation of continuous
business dealings with both boycott and non-boycott countries,
segregation of boycott-tainted income and expenses is far more
difficult. If a U.S. manufacturer delivers goods to a port in the
United States for shipment overseas, some part of the goods
may be bound for boycott countries and some to non-boycott
countries. How is the expense of delivering the goods to the port
to be segregated between boycott and non-boycott taxable
income?
Congress has provided a partial answer to the question by
providing for the International Boycott Factor. In essence it has
fallen back on cost accounting techniques to segregate boycott-
tainted net income. This is the case unless the U.S. taxpayer
can clearly identify all boycott activities and they are all in fact
separate and apart from all non-boycott activities. The compu-
tation of the Internationel Boycott Factor will require addi-
tional record keeping and computations on the part of the U.S.
taxpayer. The extent of the additional effort will not be clear
until the Treasury publishes regulations on the precise method
which must be used in computing this factor. Nonetheless, the
additional computation will be required even though the tax-
payer will gain no tax advantage and, for the most part, the
boycott activities are not illegal per se.
The anti-boycott provisions of the Tax Reform Act are a
particularly crude device for punishing what is perceived as
morally wrong behavior because it cannot distinguish between
degrees of culpability or between "good" and "bad" boycotts.
If two identically situated taxpayers both agree to participate
in a boycott, both lose identical tax benefits. It makes no differ-
ence that the extent of one taxpayer's agreement was to permit
boycott language to appear on a letter of credit while the other
taxpayer's agreement was a refusal to do business with boycot-
ted businesses, a refusal to hire individuals because of race,
religion, or nationality, or a refusal to ship goods with certain
carriers.
The Tax Reform Act perceives all boycotts as either U.S.
sanctioned and "good" or non-U.S. sanctioned and "bad." The
result of such narrow thinking is that the United States could
VOL. 6:613
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indirectly encourage immoral behavior far more serious than
the perceived evil of participation in international boycotts.
In 1939, the United Kingdom and Nazi Germany were at
war. The United States was officially neutral and presumably
would not have officially sanctioned a United Kingdom boycott
of Germany. Under the present anti-boycott provisions of the
TRA, U.S. taxpayers would have lost U.S. tax benefits for all
business which was related to the United Kingdom. Indirectly,
the United States would have been aiding Nazi Germany. A
critic might charge that if such events occur in the future it
would be easy enough to amend the Act to include an exception
for a "good" boycott. However, it is difficult to conceive of a
situation where the United States might remain neutral in an
international conflict but at the same time pass partisan tax
legislation.
In short, any attempt to use the tax laws to discourage
morally repugnant activities should be approached with ex-
treme caution. This is particularly true when the activities
which .are to be discouraged are broadly defined and not readily
susceptible to precise accounting treatment. If Congress truly
wishes to discourage participation in international boycotts it
should make the activities illegal per se and punish those who
engage in the acts. Properly enforced, such a criminal law
would r'esult in no U.S. tax benefits for boycott-tainted income
because no U.S. taxpayer would have such income.
D. But Who Will Sign the Report?
The anti-boycott provisions of the Tax Reform Act require
U.S. taxpayers to report on their worldwide international boy-
cott activities. The report will be submitted to the U.S. Treas-
ury as a part of the taxpayer's annual income tax return. Its
accuracy and truthfulness will be attested to under penalties
of perjury." A willful failure to file the report can result in
criminal prosecution. 7 Needless to say, the U.S. taxpayer will
be under a strong compulsion to submit a complete and accur-
ate boycott report.
The U.S. taxpayer may find that it is faced with a di-
lemna. Many of the boycott activities reported may be illegal
66. Id. § 6065.
67. Id. § 999(f).
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under state, federal, or foreign law. Refusing to hire or to have
business dealings with individuals because of race, religion, or
nationality could very well violate civil rights laws. Refusing to
do business with a person or company because it does business
in a boycotted country might violate antitrust law. Failure to
support fully a foreign country's boycott law may subject the
U.S. taxpayer to criminal prosecution in the boycott country.
Yet, each of the potentially criminal acts must be fully re-
ported to the U.S. Government in a sworn statement. The
question must be asked whether the taxpayer might raise a
fifth amendment defense to submitting the report based on
self-incrimination."
In a recent case, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that,
in general, a taxpayer may not assert the fifth amendment
right in a nontax criminal prosecution to suppress the introduc-
tion into evidence of the taxpayer's return. 9 The Court clearly
indicated that if a taxpayer intended to claim the fifth amend-
ment privilege it had to be done by refusing to complete the
relevant portions of the tax return. Thus, it would seem that if
a taxpayer suspected his boycott report might be used in a
subsequent nontax criminal prosecution, it should either not
file a boycott report or should file a return but include a state-
ment to the effect that the privilege has been claimed. In a
subsequent criminal prosecution for willful failure to file a re-
turn, the Court seems to indicate that a valid assertion of the
privilege is an absolute defense to the crime charged. A good
faith assertion of the privilege, even if mistaken, will presuma-
bly rebut a charge of willfulness. 0 However, this later proposi-
tion can not be stated with certainty at this time and will have
to await further litigation.7'
This recent case even gives hope that a U.S. taxpayer
might be able to suppress the boycott report in a nontax crimi-
nal prosecution even when the privilege was not asserted at the
time of filing the tax return. The Court asserted that the legal
requirement to file a tax return was not sufficient compulsion
68. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
69. Garner v. United States. 424 U.S. 648 (1976).
70. See United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976), for the proposition that
wilfullness does not imply evil intent in a tax prosecution but only "a voluntary
intentional violation of a known legal duty."
71. 424 U.S. at 666 (Marshall, J. concurring).
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in and of itself to say that a taxpayer was compelled to testify
against himself. It pointed out that the requirement applies to
all persons who earn income and the mere completing of a tax
return is not an admission of criminal activity. When, however,
the only persons required to file a particular report or pay a
particular tax are those guilty of nontax criminal activities, the
Court recognized the compulsive nature of the requirement to
file a return.7" Here even a stated refusal to file indicated possi-
ble criminal activity. If most or all compliance with interna-
tional boycotts is in fact illegal under federal or state law and,
therefore, all U.S. taxpayers who report such activities are in
fact admitting to criminal acts, is not the boycott report com-
pelled testimony and thus subject to being suppressed?
Claiming the privilege will depend on whether the tax-
payer has a reasonable belief that criminal prosecution is possi-
ble. Numerous threshold questions could arise such as the fol-
lowing.
Who has committed the criminal act?
If the U.S. taxpayer is an individual it would seem clear who
the potential criminal would be. If the U.S. taxpayer is a trust
or corporation, the criminal acts might be those of the taxpayer
and its officers, directors, or trustees. If an officer signs a report
which details the corporation's misdeeds, does the officer be-
come a participant in the criminal activity even if wholly inno-
cent before?
Where is the criminal act committed?
If the criminal act is in the jurisdiction of the government
which has made the act a crime, little problem arises. However,
in many instances, most of the activity will in fact occur in a
foreign jurisdiction. Can U.S. persons be prosecuted for acts
which take place outside a state or the United States? Is the
case stronger if the foreign actor is 100 percent controlled by
the U.S. person?
Can a fifth amendment privilege be asserted when the
72. 424 U.S. at 658, discussing the applicability of Mackey v. United States, 401
U.S. 667 (1971); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); and Grosso v. United
States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) to the plaintiff's claim that he was compelled to file a tax
return and incriminate himself. The three cases cited pertain to the federal excise and
information return on wagering and the fact that only gamblers were required to file
this return.
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criminal prosecution could only occur in a jurisdiction outside
the United States?
The stated purpose of the privilege is to assure that the U.S.
judicial system remains adversary in nature."3 If this is the
case, the privilege should not be available when the criminal
prosecution can only occur outside the United States.
There are no doubt other preliminary questions which
each U.S. taxpayer will have to face before it would assert the
privilege and refuse to submit a boycott report. Each question
could no doubt be the subject of an independent treatise on
criminal or constitutional law. Suffice it to say that in the
proper circumstances the privilege can and should be asserted
when the tax return is filed.
III. THE PROHIBITORY LEGISLATION
The anti-boycott sections of the Export Administration
Act of 197711 represent the strongest opposition to the Arab
boycott to date. This statute was the result of a considerable
effort by U.S. exporters and the "Israel lobby" to arrive at a
compromise piece of legislation which would have the effect of
prohibiting compliance with the Arab boycott of Israel without
destroying U.S. trade with the Arab countries.75 It is, therefore,
a good deal more moderate than previous bills, but nonetheless
shares some of the objectionable features of the tax legislation.
These anti-boycott sections prohibit the taking of or agree-
ing to take certain actions "with intent to comply with, further,
or support any boycott fostered or imposed by a foreign country
against a country which is friendly with the United States
"" Stated simply, these are:
1. Refusing to do business with the boycotted country or
its nationals or with any other person pursuant to an agreement
with, requirement of, or a request from, or on behalf of any
boycotting country.77
2. Refusing to employ or otherwise discriminate against
73. 424 U.S. at 655, citing Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415
(1966).
74. Export Administration Amendments of 1977, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-13.
75. THE NEw REPUBLIC, June 4, 1977, at 17.
76. Export Administration Amendments of 1977, § 4A(a)(1).
77. Id. § 4A(a)(1)(A).
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persons of a particular race, religion, nationality, or national
origin.7"
3. Furnishing information regarding a person's race, reli-
gion, nationality, or national origin.79
4. Furnishing information about whether a person does,
has done, or proposes to do business with the boycotted country
or its nationals or with any person known or believed to be
boycotted.'"
5. Furnishing information about whether any person is a
member, has made contributions to, or is otherwise associated
with organizations which support a boycotted country."
6. Paying, honoring, or confirming any letter of credit
which contains a condition which is prohibited by the anti-
boycott rules of the United States."
The drafters of the statute appear to have been careful to
insure that the law would serve as an antidote to the Arab
boycott, not simply to proscribe certain conduct. The six pro-
hibited acts are only unlawful if done with the intent of
complying with a foreign boycott. The broad prohibition
against refusing do business with a boycotted country is only
applicable if a refusal is made pursuant to a request from a
boycotting country, and with the stipulation that
[tihe mere absence of a business relationship with or in the
boycotted country, with any business concern organized under
the laws of the boycotted country, with any national or resident
of the boycotted country, or with any other person, does not
indicate the existence of the intent required to establish a viola-
tion of rules and regulations issued to carry out this subpara-
graph. "
Furthermore, the Act seems to be a conscious attempt to
restrict only the secondary and tertiary aspects of the Arab
boycott without infringing upon the sovereignty of the coun-
tries involved. To this end, a group of exceptions to the broad
strictures listed above has been included in the Act. Regula-
tions to be written will contain exceptions for:
78. Id. § 4A(a)(1)(B).
79. Id. § 4A(a)(1)(C).
80. Id. § 4A(a)(1)(D).
81. Id. § 4A(a)(1)(E).
82. Id. § 4A(a)(1)(F).
83. Id. § 4A(a)(1)(A).
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1. Complying with the import restrictions of boycotting
countries on goods produced in the boycotted country. 4
2. Complying with the shipping requirements of the boy-
cotting countries as to carrier and route. 5
3. Furnishing information as to the country of origin of
goods and the names and routes of shippers. Until June of 1978,
this information may be in the form of negative or blacklisting
terms, for example, "This shipment contains no goods manu-
factured in Israel." After June of 1978, only positive informa-
tion will be permitted. 6 At this writing, most Arab countries
accept positive certifications.
4. Complying with the unilateral positive selection, by a
purchaser in a boycotting country, of an importing carrier, an
insurer, suppliers of services to be performed in a boycotting
country, or suppliers. 7 The prohibition against the furnishing
of information regarding a person's race, religion, national ori-
gin, or nationality remains in force, however.8
5. Complying with the transshipment 8 and immigra-
tion"0 requirements of boycotting countries.
6. "[Clompliance by a United States person resident in
a foreign country . . .with the laws of that country with re-
spect to his activities exclusively therein . . . ."' Again, the
strictures regarding the furnishing of information as to a per-
son's nationality, race, or religion are still in force. Since a
"person" is defined as a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. corpora-
tion, the last exception is of particular significance. Its intent
is to avoid, to some extent, the extraterritorial application of
U.S. law.
The anti-boycott provisions of the Export Administration
Act seem to be a rather reasonable reaction to a perceived, if
not a real, problem. Despite the exception for compliance with
local law, it is submitted that the potential of prohibiting for-
84. Id. § 4A(a)(2)(A).
85. Id.
86. Id. § 4A(a)(2)(B).
87. Id. § 4A(a)(2)(C).
88. Id. § 4A(a)(3).
89. Id. § 4A(a)(2)(D).
90. Id. § 4A(a)(2)(E).
91. Id. § 4A(a)(2)(F).
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eign subsidiaries from engaging in conduct required by the
country in which they are incorporated is substantial. Further,
the Act could have the undesired effect of dampening trade
with Israel; firms could understandably be reluctant to enter
preliminary negotiations with an Israeli purchaser for fear that
if a potential bargain should fail they may be accused of not
completing the transaction because of their "wish" to comply
with the Arab boycott.
The past practice of many Arab countries has been to ig-
nore the boycott for products for which there is no viable alter-
native supplier. The statute may thus have the effect of caus-
ing small U.S. exporters in highly competitive industries to be
boycotted while large manufacturers which occupy a dominant
position in an industry continue to sell to the Arab markets.
Perhaps the most relevant question is whether such legis-
lation is needed at all. U.S. exporters have in the past shown a
remarkable ability to deal effectively with both Israel and the
Arab countries in spite of the boycott. Given the fact that
discrimination against U.S. citizens due to the boycott is al-
ready prohibited, one might question the need to attack the
Arab boycott itself.
IV. CONCLUSION
The disclosure, the tax, and the prohibitory boycott legis-
lation suffer from similar disabilities which make them need-
lessly burdensome and in some respects unwise as policy.
First, there is a general failure to adequately distinguish
between conduct which has the effect of discriminating against
U.S. persons and firms and the mere furnishing of information
which has no effect on U.S. trade. The disclosure regulations
have to some extent rectified this problem by changing the
reporting form to remove the word "comply" with respect to
the reporting of certain information, but the Tax Reform Act
and the Export Administration Act both apply to the furnish-
ing of information. As mentioned previously, the Arab boycott
apparatus touches the majority of U.S. exporters only with
respect to certification that exports to boycotting countries do
not contain Israeli components and are not shipped on a black-
listed vessel. Much less frequently, exporters or investors are
required to furnish information as to their involvement with
1977
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Israel .12 The exceptions in the Export Administration Act
would assumedly permit the former, but would unequivocably
prohibit the latter, even for information which is a mere state-
ment of fact, not requiring or indicating action on the part of
the furnisher. Thus far, U.S. businesses have successfully dealt
with both Israel and the Arab countries. It is submitted that
lumping such conduct which does not discriminate against
U.S. persons, together with clearly discriminatory conduct, has
the effect of needlessly discrediting action not affecting U.S.
persons and dampening U.S. trade with the Arab countries.
Similarly, all three pieces of legislation do not adequately
distinguish between the primary boycott of Israel by the Arab
League countries and the secondary boycott of firms doing
business with Israel. Opposition to the former is clearly beyond
the reach of U.S. legislation. It is submitted that the legisla-
tion, particularly the Export Administration Act, has the ef-
fect, if not the intent, of interfering with the Arab League's
primary boycott of Israel. For example, section 4A(a)(2)(A) of
the statute excepts from the broad prohibitions compliance
with the import requirements of boycotting countries that im-
ports not be manufactured in Israel. Part of the boycott, how-
ever, is to prohibit the importation of goods manufactured else-
where but containing components manufactured in Israel.
Since the statute does not except compliance with such a re-
quirement, its effect is to force the boycotting countries either
to alter their boycott requirements or not to import U.S. goods.
Furthermore, since the prohibitory legislation 3 and the tax
legislation94 apply to actions taken by all foreign subsidiaries
of U.S. companies, they thus represent yet another extraterri-
torial application of U.S. business regulation." It is ironic that
at a time when many countries are objecting to the imposition
of U.S. sponsored boycotts on the foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
companies, legislation has been enacted which discourages or
92. See, e.g., regulations issued under article 291(4) of the Commercial Code of
Iraq regarding the formation of branches of foreign companies.
93. Export Administration Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, § 204, 91 Stat. 247,
amending 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410 (1969).
94. I.R.C. §§ 999(a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(2), (c)(1).
95. See generally Bradfield, United States Extraterritorial Commerce Regula-
tions, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS 19 (V. Cameron ed. 1976).
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prohibits those same subsidiaries from taking action with re-
spect to boycotts not sanctioned by the United States. Na-
tional treatment for foreign investors is a theme upon which the
United States has consistently played. The inclusion of the
foreign subsidiaries in a growing number of U.S. regulatory
laws is inconsistent with the goal of national treatment of the
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies. This is especially true
when the U.S. regulatory policy is contrary to that of the host
country, as is often the case with boycott regulations.
Finally, the legislation in general seems to arise from a
confused set of motives. The underlying policy of the Export
Administration Act is that foreign boycotts are inimical to a
U.S. economic policy favoring classical notions of free trade.
However, the United States itself has been a participant in,
and indeed the instigator of, a number of boycotts and embar-
goes directed against foreign countries." Both that fact and the
likelihood of dampened U.S. trade with the Arab world cast
doubt upon the proposition that the anti-boycott legislation is
solely designed to promote free trade. In this respect, an even
more hypocritical motive is the notion that boycotts per se, and
in particular the Arab boycott, are somehow immoral. 7
A more likely motivation is simply the foreign policy objec-
tive of aiding Israel, a proposition which is supported by the
congratulatory statement of Israel's Foreign Minister to the
American Jewish Congress "on the successful outcome of ef-
forts to secure legislation against practices of boycott and dis-
crimination. ' '9 8 If this is the case, however, there is no reason
to cause burdensome reporting and compliance requirements
by including all foreign boycotts under the umbrella of the U.S.
legislation. The number of boycotts likely to be discovered
96. Craig, Application of the Trading with the Enemy Act to Foreign Corporations
Owned by Americans: Reflections on Fruehauf v. Massardy, 83 HARV. L. REv. 579
(1970); Muir, The Boycott in International Law, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 187, 190 (1974);
Comment, The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 and Foreign-Based Subsidiaries
of American Multinational Corporations: A Time to Abstain from Restraining, 11 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 206 (1973).
97. President Carter stated in a debate with former President Ford, "It's not a
matter of diplomacy or trade with me. It's a matter of morality." quoted in THE NEW
REPUBLIC, June 4, 1977, at 17. See also Noonan, Bribes and the Boycott, 62 A.B.A.J.
1606 (1976).
98. 1 Boycorr Raeoir 3 (1977).
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around the world may be substantial, and not all of them will
be directed against as clear cut an ally as Israel. At a time when
there is a genuine opportunity for an overall Middle East
peace, a strong pro-Israeli measure such as the anti-boycott
legislation may ultimately have an unintended deleterious ef-
fect on that opportunity.
